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Subjectivity, intentionality, self-awareness and will are major components of
consciousness in human beings. Changes in consciousness and its content following
different brain processes and malfunction have long been studied. Cognitive sciences
assume that brain activities have an infrastructure, but there is also evidence that
consciousness itself may change this infrastructure. The two-way influence between
brain and consciousness has been at the center of philosophy and less so, of science.
This so-called bottom-up and top-down interrelationship is controversial and is the subject
of our article. We would like to ask: how does it happen that consciousness may provoke
structural changes in the brain? The living brain means continuous changes at the synaptic
level with every new experience, with every new process of learning, memorizing or
mastering new and existing skills. Synapses are generated and dissolved, while others are
preserved, in an ever-changing process of so-called neuroplasticity. Ongoing processes
of synaptic reinforcements and decay occur during wakefulness when consciousness is
present, but also during sleep when it is mostly absent. We suggest that consciousness
influences brain neuroplasticity both during wakefulness as well as sleep in a top-down
way. This means that consciousness really activates synaptic flow and changes brain
structures and functional organization. The dynamic impact of consciousness on brain
never stops despite the relative stationary structure of the brain. Such a process can be a
target for medical intervention, e.g., by cognitive training.
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INTRODUCTION
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul
(Henley, 1904/1875).
On Friday evening, at 6:30 pm, on the 4th of August 2006, at the
age of 66, while sitting at his table, holding his head with his right
hand, I.K. suddenly fell down on his face. He could not move
his right leg and arm, neither could he call for help as his abil-
ity to speak has been lost. It was later found that his left common
carotid artery was obliterated, and stopped supplying blood and
oxygen to the left half of his brain. I.K. experienced a disastrous
ischemic stroke: within a few minutes almost a quarter of his
brain was destroyed, with the dramatic consequences of a paral-
ysis of the right side of his body (hemiplegia), a loss of speaking
and comprehension capabilities (aphasia) and inability to write
(agraphia).
In this difficult situation, I.K. could still listen to the doc-
tors around him who discussed his situation. At that time,
the neurologists could see that I.K. had suffered severe struc-
tural damage and had little hope for his recuperation. But,
a year later it became evident that I.K. had experienced
an unexpected rehabilitation. Four years after his incident,
I.K. could already play the piano with his left hand, write
books and poems, paint and exhibit his paintings to the
public.
What has happened? One potential explanation had to do with
the fact that I.K. had an exceptionally developed right hemisphere
(the intact one), which had been enhanced by years of playing
piano and painting in his free time. No doubt that these activities
have played an important role in his surprising recovery. But there
is an additional second explanation. In one of his poems written
after his incident, I.K. presented his decision to conduct a new
form of life: “I want to talk words of wisdom, but I know that my
mouth will betray me when I speak . . . So what is left for me? I
have the will to live, not as I want, but as I can.” This decision was
taken despite his dramatic symptoms that included difficulties in
writing (dysgraphia), word repetition (perseveration), new words
creation (neologisms) and more. It was a conscious decision that
represented an act of will and can be considered the source for his
astonishing rehabilitation.
Twenty two days after his stroke he created the following pic-
ture which shows the paralyzed thumb of his right arm half
covered by heads and half empty. The picture demonstrates his
struggle to understand his new state. Two years later he painted
a city as a structure of chess maintaining houses, entitled by him
“Chess board,” image of his rehabilitation.
It is worthwhile to note that it was I.K.’s linguistic, communi-
cation, and expressional capabilities that have recovered but less
so his motor skills. The secret of this marvelous transformation
might have been rooted in his power of will and firm decision
to live in the best possible way he can, even though it is severely
limited. An involvement of a top-down effect of consciousness on
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the neuroplasticity of his brain may explain the rehabilitation of
I.K., unlike many others in his state.
Cases of patient recovery after stroke have been reported by
Norman Doidge who wrote in his book:
The human brain can change itself, as told through the stories of
the scientists, doctors, and patients who have together brought
about these astonishing transformations . . . Some were patients
who had what were thought to be incurable brain problems; oth-
ers were people without specific problems who simply wanted
to improve the functioning of their brains or preserve them as
they aged. For 400 years this venture would have been inconceiv-
able because mainstreammedicine and science believed that brain
anatomy was fixed (Doidge, 2007).
These words imply that consciousness and will can have an
important role in brain recovery, but might not be always suffi-
cient for certain kinds of brain damages. Brain recovery is more
common in brain which preserve consciousness, memory and
cognition. It is less common either in long unconscious states, or
in brainstem lesions that are less plastic, have less redundancy, and
recover very rarely if at all.When I.K. said: “I want to talk words of
wisdom, but I know that my mouth will betray me when I speak”
he intuitively recognized this distinction. He felt that his thinking
and language capacities might recover, but less so his motor skills
that are needed for speaking.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the controversial coex-
istence of a two-way interrelationship between consciousness and
brain biochemistry and neural networks. According to serial and
modular bottom-up theories, brain perception extracts features
from world reality through the senses. Perception is integrated
through higher regions and functions of the brain andmay finally
involve attention and consciousness.
The philosopher Remo Bodei has suggested that in wakeful-
ness the personality is much more unified and under the control
of reason, while in dreaming various personalities tend to exist
in parallel in a state of delirium. In other words, a state of con-
sciousness is reached in a converged and ordered mode, achieving
gestalt, while a state of dreaming is reached in a diverged and
confused mode. Converged mode invites a unified mentalization
while diverged mode invites differentiation and plurality. Both
of these modes are needed for normal life. In order to translate
this concept into a horizontal-vertical axis, the upwardmovement
attempts to ascend to rationality and gestalt, while the downward
movement to distributed and fragmented functions. An attempt
to draw powers from a unified function to affect distributed func-
tions and structures seems possible if the integrative process can
overcome local lesions.
At this point we have to make a distinction between the
degrees of gestalt reached by different individuals at a time of
injury. According to this view, an interference to bottom-up and
top-down processes may vary from one individual to another
and influence the elaboration of consciousness. Thought and
consciousness are activated by sense-data, but on their turn ini-
tiate parallel and interactive processes in the brain where both
lower levels (e.g., perception) and higher levels of cognition
(e.g., memory, conceptual systems, and world knowledge) occur
simultaneously and interactively.
The dynamic nature of the brain is maintained by its neuro-
plasticity which is closely related to consciousness. In his book,
Norman Doidge wrote:
The idea that the brain can change its own structure and func-
tion through thought and activity is, I believe, the most important
alteration in our view of the brain since we first sketched out
its basic anatomy and the workings of its basic component, the
neuron (Doidge, 2007).
Vision is a sense that has been researched the most of all senses.
During the twentieth century there were major steps that have
contributed to our understanding of visual complexity. In 1916,
Holmes and Lister discovered the retinotopic distorted map-
ping in the striate cortex (V1 through V5). Holmes and Lister
examined and observed 2000 wounded soldiers, who had dev-
astating brain injuries combined with vision impairments. They
documented each of the cases within diagrams of the back of
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the head, where the position of the wound was represented
approximately on a diagram of the back of the head. Horizontal
lines represented the distance of the plane above the inion, and
vertical lines represented the distance from the middle line of
the skull. The location of the wounds were then compared with
the character of his blindness for each of the soldiers. A reason-
able conclusion was reached, which was that visual information
is received in the retina and transferred to the primary visual
cortex, where it is kept in the form of an image or represen-
tation. Holmes and Lister defined the brain area which is the
“cerebral localization of vision, and more particularly . . . the
representation of different regions of the retina in the cortex”
(Holmes and Lister, 1916).
It is a part of visual perception circuits in the brain and sup-
port a bottom-up theory where visual information flows through
the brain, first perceived in the retina and then integrated and
interpreted in the cortex.
In the early years of the 1960th, (Leary and Alpert, 1962)
conducted their controversial research on “The psychedelic hallu-
cinogenic effect of drugs” using psychotropic substances (mostly
psilocybin mushrooms and LSD). They demonstrated that bio-
chemistry at the synaptic level forms a basis for changes in
vision.
In 1965, (Yarbus, 1967) published his book on eye movements
and vision which was based on simple methodology, but had
followed an extremely perseverant work. Yarbus discovered “the
predominant preferences for faces of the brain perception,” which
means that visual perception is not a replica of what comes to
vision. He also demonstrated that eye movements are task ori-
ented and are different in cases of free observations than in cases
of conscious efforts to record specific information from a scene
(Yarbus, 1967).
Since Yarbus, task oriented eye movements are commonly
referred to as a top-down process where conscious goals can direct
low level functions of perception.
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In 1981, Hubel andWiesel received a Nobel Prize for discover-
ing “The specific orientation of columns and layers perpendicular
to the surface of primary visual cortex—V1.”
They could show that the brain of cats can change after they
were blinded in one eye. The portion of the cat’s brain associated
with the blinded eye has changed to process visual information
from the open eye. This research contributed to the understand-
ing of neural plasticity of the visual system in the brain that
follows experience.
In 1988, Livingston and Hubel described “The visual path-
ways of form, color, depth, motion and perception.” Their theory
showed a bottom-up flow of visual information from the retina,
through the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus, then
the primary visual cortex, and finally the extrastriate cortex. Each
of these brain areas performs a specific processing of the visual
information and provides its output to the next area:
The primate visual system consists of several separate and
independent subdivisions that analyze different aspects of the
same retinal image . . . Moreover, perceptual experiments can be
designed to ask which subdivisions of the system are responsible
for particular visual abilities (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988).
In 1995, Milner and Goodale described “The Visual Brain in
Action” with two separate dorsal and ventral streams of visual
pathways that have however “multiple connections between
them” and “a successful integration of their complementary con-
tributions.” They suggested an unknown interaction among these
streams and other parts of the brain that achieves a purpose
directed performance of the visual system.
(Source: Milner and Goodale, 1995)
They asked:
How the two streams interact both with each other and with other
brain regions in the production of purposive behavior (Milner and
Goodale, 1998).
This infers that in order to be able to achieve visual perception
of the surrounding world, the whole nervous system has to work
within a dynamic structure of connectivity and complexity, which
can be termed the “gestalt brain.”
Researchers in Indiana University and Lausanne University
Hospital have suggested the term connectome, for a brain net-
work of neurons and their interactions (Sporns et al., 2005). Their
suggestion was followed in 2009 by the creation of the Human
Connectome Project, whose focus is to build an anatomical and
functional network map of the human brain. The Human Brain
Project of Henry Markram consists of building a computerized
human brain able to simulate a bottom up fashion of artifi-
cial brain, in which the top-down effects are not expected to be
reached.
Tononi, Edelman and Sporns have responded with a concept of
“two fundamental aspects of brain organization” that seem to be
in conflict: “the functional segregation of local areas that differ in
their anatomy and physiology contrasts sharply with their global
integration.” They consider complexity as the major element of
the brain vision system and have tried to elaborate methods of
measuring it (Tononi et al., 1994).
Dynamic neuroplasticity belong also to the high levels of
complexity of the brain circuits. In the visual cortex, new con-
nections are developed after birth and attain their specificity
by pruning. Circuit selection depends on visual experience, and
the selection criterion is the correlation of activity (Lowel and
Singer, 1992). At the highest level of complexity the brain gestalt
creates consciousness and the first stage of a top-down pathway
is realized. A number of computational models were developed
mimicking the gestalt phenomena exemplified by the perception
of a visual scene and its segmentation into objects (Wang and
Terman, 1997).
The realization of vision at its highest level of complexity
is coincident with the achievement of the same level of com-
plexity of other senses, and at this point a certain biochemical
constellation characterizes the whole brain.
The disastrous ischemic stroke of I.K., blocked within min-
utes his brain gestalt. The recuperation process, in the following
weeks, made possible the restoration of a certain level of gestalt,
which made possible the conscious decision “to conduct a new
form of life.” The surprising atypical rehabilitation occurred as
a result of the influence of the top-down consciousness effect
on brain biochemical constellation, neuronal organization and
function.
The initiation of brain processes in the higher brain regions
results in an activation of lower brain regions, or the influ-
ence of the state of consciousness, on structures of the brain,
at bio-chemical and neuroplasticity levels. Neuroplasticity occurs
through cellular changes due to learning and memorizing, but
also within large-scale changes of cortical remapping in response
to injury. Neurogenesis of brain cells can take place in certain
locations of the brain, such as the hippocampus, the olfactory
bulb, and the cerebellum.
We would like to suggest that the content of consciousness
can change without sensorial inputs, as is the case in dreaming.
Changes in memory involve continuous structural changes in the
brain, both during wakefulness and during sleep. This does not
entail a dualistic approach to consciousness and brain but rather
another aspect of the living brain as also suggested by Tononi,
Sporns, and Edelman. We would like to suggest that top-down
and bottom-up processes of consciousness and brain are two
aspects of the same complex dynamic and plastic nervous system.
CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN, INTERACTION
But the will is by its nature so free that it can’t ever be constrained.
. . . And the activity of the soul consists entirely in the fact that
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simply by willing something it brings it about that the little gland
to which it is closely joined moves in the manner required to pro-
duce the effect corresponding to this volition (Descartes, 1649/1985,
Vol. I: 343).
But when the soul uses its will to determine itself to some which
is not just intelligible but also imaginable, this thought makes a new
impression in the brain, and this thought is not a passion in it, but an
action which is properly called imagination (Descartes, 1645/2007:
119).
The famous philosopher is most known for his definition of a
human being as an entity composed of a thinking mind and a
physical body. Descartes was puzzled by the impact of the will
and thought on the brain, which seems to contradict the laws of
physics. He was of the opinion that the will can result in thoughts
that are based both on sensorial experiences and self creative
imagination, and that thoughts can actually move the brain. Since
his time, the Cartesian mind have been replaced by a more mod-
ern concept of consciousness and the brain has took the place of
the body to form the “hard problem of consciousness” as defined
by the philosopher David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995). It has been
often said that consciousness is an illusion (e.g., Dennett, 1992)
and so is free will (e.g., Wegner, 2002). Every event in the world
is caused by other prior events in compliance with the laws of
nature. And according to the laws of nature, states of the brain
cause human thoughts and feelings. This approach is consistent
with the natural sciences such as physics and chemistry and denies
that an immaterial substance without a mass can cause a material
substance to move directly or indirectly. By the same token, tra-
ditional neuroscience has defined that a destruction of a major
portion of the left hemisphere of the brain in a right dominant
person should result in the elimination of all language capabili-
ties independent of any conscious act of will (Popper and Eccles,
1977).
But, writes philosopher John Searle, to accept a scientific view
of consciousness does not entitle that consciousness does not
exist. In fact, he thinks that both the brain and consciousness do
exist, while consciousness is a higher level view of the brain:
• Conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology,
are real phenomena in the real world.
• All forms of consciousness are caused by the behavior of
neurons and are realized in the brain system, which is itself
composed of neurons.
• Conscious states . . . exist at a level higher than that of neurons
and synapses. Individual neurons are not conscious, but por-
tions of the brain system composed of neurons are conscious.
• Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they
function causally.
• Consciousness is a system-level, biological feature (Searle,
2004: 112–115).
According to Searle, there is no problem in changing con-
sciousness and by that causing the brain to change. A change can
be made in the highest level of the brain system or in its lowest
level, and the results will include changes in both neurons and
consciousness.
We consider consciousness as the result of the growing com-
plexity of connectome activities. Loss of consciousness due to
a damage to the cerebrum is often recoverable, while loss due
to damage to the brainstem is not. Major damages to the brain
may be recovered and consciousness regained through the brain
capacity for physical and functional change. However, when there
is a vast damage to the brain and the brainstem (the major path-
way from the external world to the internal world), consciousness
is completely and permanently lost. Brain death and unrecover-
able coma with unconsciousness are among these terminal cases,
in which neuroplasticity is mostly absent. We can conclude that
consciousness favors brain plasticity.
Block andMacDonald (2008) consider two types of conscious-
ness. A phenomenal consciousness that goes beyond cognitive
accessibility and a narrower access consciousness “a subject can
have an experience that he does not and cannot think about.”
Phenomenal consciousness consists of rich experience and feel-
ings, and only part of it reaches thoughts. “although much of
the detail in each picture is phenomenally registered, it is not
conceptualized at a level that allows cognitive access.” Access con-
sciousness consists of information held in the cognitive system
for the purposes of reasoning. Accordingly, there is a more local-
ized core neurological basis for phenomenological consciousness,
and there is a broader total neural basis which initiates a level
of access consciousness, e.g., a level that involves abstract con-
cepts and language. The core neurological basis can interact
with the total neural basis in both a bottom-up and top-down
fashions.
Block andMacDonald think that the brain records experiences
within a phenomenal consciousness in core neural bases of con-
sciousness. They provide an example of the fusiform face area, at
the bottom of the right temporal lobe in the brain, which is acti-
vated with a visual experience of faces, and might be regarded
as the core neural basis of face perception. Not like phenome-
nal consciousness, access consciousness involves the whole brain
or the gestalt brain, which Block and MacDonald call the total
neural basis of consciousness. Gestalt brain includes working
memory, attention, high level information processing and inte-
gration, rationality, intentionality and introspection, achieving a
high state of consciousness which can in turn influence changes
in specific parts of the brain structures and functions, lan-
guage, thoughts and reports (Block, 2005; Block andMacDonald,
2008).
What can be said of access consciousness as a function of the
whole brain? It is essential to the sense of the self. It can include
imagined objects and events independent of having experience. It
is capable of creative and seemingly uncaused function. That is, it
can initiate a chain of events without identifiable causes. We have
many evidences that consciousness can cause physical changes. It
has features such as intentionality and purpose that are hard to
explain by past events. It can change itself and it has a self heal-
ing capacity which means that in general it can both improve and
cure itself—at least to a certain extent. These capabilities of con-
sciousness have been utilized in rehabilitation plans for patients
who suffered brain strokes, or for improvement of attention and
memory decline in old adults by cognitive training programs
(Smith et al., 2009).
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Levine (1983) has introduced the term “the explanatory gap”
and later Chalmers (1995) has coined “the hard problem of con-
sciousness,” both expressed the opinion that consciousness has a
subjective basis that can not be observed and experienced by a
third party neither can it be explained by reductive methods—
namely by empirical sciences. According to them, it is possible
to describe processes in the brain in a scientific objective way,
based on observations, but it is not possible to describe personal
experience in such a way.
Even without a scientific explanation, the interrelationship
between consciousness and brain activity exists in both senses,
the observable and the subjective. The paradox of conscious-
ness arises from the fact that even though we do not have a
scientific description and explanation of access consciousness
and subjectivity based on brain structures and functions, there
are still clear evidences of correlation and even causal rela-
tions between them. Using Block and MacDonald’s concepts
of consciousness we can conclude that the content of con-
sciousness can be changed by experience, but also outside of
experience.
CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN, AND LANGUAGE
At the center of research of both human brain and cognition
stays language. Consciousness has an interesting and important
relationships with language. Thoughts can be changed by lan-
guage, sounds, articulation, learning, written text, concepts and
associations. Human beings use language all the time for both
communication and for thinking. Language provides a frame for
beliefs and presumptions and enables deliberation. The interre-
lationship between thoughts, language and brain structures and
functions has been demonstrated by fMRI studies.
fMRI demonstrates that language effects areas in the brain.
Different parts of the brain may be activated by different lin-
guistic content. For example, emotional text can cause activity
in parts of the brain that have to do with emotions within
the limbic system, such as the amygdala, while decision pro-
cess may activate other areas such as the prefrontal cortex.
Language activates Broca’s area for articulation and Wernicke’s
area for comprehension, both reside in the left brain hemisphere.
Some of the linguistic activities that take place in wakeful-
ness stay with us and become stable in the form of long term
memories.
The interrelationship between the content of consciousness
and brain activity as demonstrated by language seems to be con-
comitant. But how are experiences, thoughts and other mental
events recorded in the brain? What happens when we study
a new language or develop our knowledge and skills of our
first language? Such activities start with consciousness and some
brain activity (as can be observed by fMRI and other imaging
technologies), and with acquisition of new short term explicit
memories, that may later become long term and implicit through
farther changes in the brain. On their side, practicing syntac-
tic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of language, and knowledge
acquisition might be accompanied by the development of auto-
matic unconscious performance of new skills and knowledge.
Still later, changes in the brain can also reverse the process,
i.e., erase memories and eliminate past knowledge, including
linguistic knowledge of words and their meanings. Language,
consciousness and the brain change together dynamically and
interactively, in ways that can be regarded as both bottom-up and
top-down. Within this interaction, language is used as a cogni-
tive tool, but it also forms a constitutive part of cognition itself
(Dascal, 2002).
There is an inherent tension between the bottom-up approach
which explores the brain in an analytic and modular way
and strives to explain the brain, and from it consciousness,
by an ensemble of neuron cells and their associated biochem-
ical processes, and a top-down approach that considers the
brain as a complex ever changing living system with integrated
and interactive parallel functions that appear in the form of
consciousness.
Neuroscientist Eric Kandel has made a distinction between
implicit memory that is acquired involuntarily “from the bot-
tom up” and assists automatic forms of response to stimulation,
and “spatial memory” which serves consciousness and is the
result of willful “top-down” registration of new memories in the
brain hippocampus, a process triggered by voluntary attention
originated in the cerebral cortex.
Language is at the center of both bottom-up and top-down
approaches. A bottom-up approach would require a physiological
localization of language faculty that would go from sounds and
phonemes, and all the way to meanings of words, sentences and
understanding of human discourse. Being connected to both the
public world and to the private thought, it is a bridge between the
physical and the mental. Localization efforts to find the physical
parts that establish mental functions in the brain were initiated by
neuroanatomist Franz Gall more than 200 years ago. The search
for a speech center in the brain made considerable progress in the
19th century, with the findings of Paul Broca who worked with
aphasia patients and defined the so-called Broca’s area as respon-
sible for articulated language. A different opinion was presented
by his contemporary neurologist John Jackson who thought the
Broca’s area could block articulation and be essential for it, but is
only a link in a chain that involves the whole brain. More recently
philosopher Karl Popper and neurophysiologist John Eccles have
jointly expressed their opinion that consciousness and brain inter-
act through a speech center within the left cerebral hemisphere of
the brain (Popper, 1994; Popper and Eccles, 1977). But the real
existence of such a speech center or even the allocation of speech
articulation, hearing, and understanding to specific locations in
the brain is still controversial.
Schnelle (2010) suggests a three fold research into language
in the brain to try and understand the relations between lan-
guage and brain. He suggests a combined study of linguistics,
psychology (which he says is the phenomenological study of the
mind), and neurocognitive science (to which he refers as biology).
A new interdisciplinary triangle of interdependent perspectives
results from the joint consideration and comparison of formal
structures, conscious phenomenological images, and brain archi-
tecture, and their functions in language. The idea of Schnelle is
to look for basic brain networks and structures that represent
pieces of knowledge or memories, and try to relate them to lan-
guage. Such brain functional neural networks are distributed over
relatively large areas within the brain and are termed “cognits”
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by him. He cites Joaquin Fuster who defined a relation between
cognition and brain networks as follows:
Cognitive functions, namely perception, attention, memory, lan-
guage, and intelligence, consist of neural transactions within and
between these networks (Fuster, 2006).
Schnelle adds that pieces of knowledge, i.e., cognits, are embed-
ded in neural networks largely through language hearing and
speaking and later also reading and writing which guide imagina-
tion and abstract structuring. Fine-tuning of brain networks will
influence both the automatic non-conscious language produc-
tion, and the conscious articulation of ideas, plans and knowledge
systems of thoughts. Instead of looking for specific static neu-
ron structures in the brain, we should look for dynamic (plastic)
distributed networks, which form pieces of linguistic knowledge
(cognits), and for their interaction to form a cognit complex. In a
way, dynamic conscious ideas cause changes in the brain.
One important cognitive resource to establish both cognition
and cognits is memory. It is possible to examine changes in con-
sciousness and the brain through the prism of dynamic memory,
recording and forgetting. Short term memory or working mem-
ory is so called because of its vulnerability—it does not hold
memories for long and presumably has a minor permanent effect
on the brain. Long term memory is more durable and involves
permanent changes in the brain through creation of proteins, and
formation and dissociation of neural networks (Kandel, 2006).
We now turn to examine how long term memory develops and
changes during sleep.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND BRAIN DURING SLEEP
So long as the mind is joined to the body, then in order for it to
remember thoughts which it had in the past, it is necessary for some
traces of them to be imprinted on the brain; it is by turning to these
[. . . ] that the mind remembers. So is it really surprising if the brain
of [. . . ] a man in a deep sleep, is unsuited to receive these traces?
(Descartes, 1649/1985, Vol. II: 247).
Descartes believed that memories are formed from thoughts dur-
ing conscious wakefulness only. Memory encoding and retrieval
take place most effectively during wakefulness (Diekelmann and
Born, 2010), but sleep also promotes the consolidation of newly
acquired information in memory and its integration within
pre-existing knowledge networks (Karni et al., 1994; Askenasy
et al., 1997). Memory consolidation during sleep is often consid-
ered as an off-line brain process of stabilization of such newly
acquired information, but there is also consolidation of false
memories of events that never happened. Acquired information
is transformed, restructured, abstracted, integrated with previ-
ously acquired memories, prioritized according to its emotional
significance, distorted, inferred and combined with false mem-
ories within the process of memory consolidation during sleep
(Payne et al., 2009).
Memory consolidation involves structural changes in the
brain. The creation of proteins, changes in neural pathways and
the creation, destruction, enhancement, and regress of neuronal
synapses which are parts of the dynamic neuroplasticity of the
nervous system. It is an important phase in learning of both pro-
cedural (how to do) and declarative (about) knowledge. Long
term memories can become implicit, automatic and uncontrolled
such as in riding bicycles, and explicit such as records of events
and facts. Consciousness is essential for an episodic and explicit
memory acquisition. When consciousness is abolished as hap-
pens during coma or epileptic seizures memory acquisition and
its associated brain processes stop. It can be inferred that neuro-
plasticity is a physical quality of the nervous system that can be
caused by changes in consciousness, which by themselves can be
caused either by explicit sensorial inputs or implicit internal states
of mind.
Sleep has been considered by Diekelmann and Born as a
state where behavioral control and consciousness are both lost.
However, dreams can be recalled upon waking-up. World events
such as loud noises can bemonitored while sleeping, they can par-
ticipate in dream developments, and can interrupt sleep. Some
forms of learning and post-learning as well as problem solving
continue during sleep. Post-learning sleep not only strengthens
memories but also induces qualitative changes in their represen-
tations and so enable the extraction of invariant features from
complex stimulus materials, the forming of new associations and,
eventually, insights into hidden rules (Diekelmann and Born,
2010). It is evident that some form of consciousness exists in this
state.
Dreams are considered as a mixture of false and true events, at
least partially caused by consciousness and result in real changes
in the brain such as the formation of new neuron networks.
Diekelmann and Born (2010) present a view that memory sys-
tems compete and reciprocally interfere during wakefulness, but
disengage during sleep, allowing for the independent consolida-
tion of memories in different systems. Nir and Tononi consider
dreaming to be a state where:
Human brain, disconnected from environment, can generate an
entire world of conscious experiences by itself, The dreamer is
highly conscious (has vivid experiences), is disconnected from the
environment (is asleep), but somehow the brain is creating a story,
filling it with actors and scenarios, and generating hallucinatory
images (Nir and Tononi, 2010).
The common denominator of many theories trying to explain
dreams is their implicit perception. Such theories include the
cognitive theory of dreaming of Hall, who stated:
The images of a dream are the concrete embodiments of the
dreamer’s thoughts; these images give visual expression to that
which is invisible, namely, conceptions (Hall, 1966).
And the activation-synthesis hypothesis of Hobson andMcCarley
which suggested an automatic and periodic brain stem neuronal
mechanism, which generates and determine the spatiotempo-
ral aspects of dream imagery, which are then compared and
synthesized with stored memories (Hobson andMcCarley, 1977).
In order to analyze the brain mechanism of dreams and
hallucinations, we have to switch from sensorial perception to
extrasensory perception or from explicit perception to implicit
perception. The field where sensorial perception interfere with
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extrasensory perception is the field of dreams and is different
from hallucinations.
Themajor difference between the two states of sleep and wake-
fulness is the switch of perception from implicit to explicit. The
blocking of implicit perception is reached by the Gestalt brain
during wakefulness. During sleep, many parts of the brain show
much reduced activity while others continue to be active. Certain
sensorial inputs to the brain are disconnected, as well as cer-
tain outputs, as muscles and movement control. Consciousness
changes and decreases in functions including voluntary con-
trol, self awareness and reflective thought. But consciousness also
increases in its emotional involvement and impaired memory
(dream amnesia) (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Nir and Tononi con-
clude that “dream consciousness can not be reduced to brain
activity in REM sleep,” and that dream is a powerful form of imag-
ination where presumably brain activity flows in a “top down”
manner.
In a state of dreaming the external world is almost absent
and an internal world exists in the brain and takes over con-
sciousness. The content of dreams is the segregated and integrated
external reality deposited in the hippocampus, posterior tempo-
ral fusiform gyrus, orbito-frontal area, limbic area, and all over
the brain which takes the place of reality. The moment we switch
to the wake state the implicit perception is differentiated from the
explicit perception and is recognized within consciousness to be a
false perception.
The unreal aspect of dreaming is later recognized by the
dreamer, and dreams are mostly separated from real experi-
ences. Dreamers are conscious when awakened that the visual
imagery that they have experienced was false due to the instant
instauration of the Gestalt brain. In the wakefulness state there
are normally no self-generated implicit perceptions that are not
caused by real experiences. Upon arousal from a dream, con-
sciousness allows the interpretation of the imagery as false. It is
a chaotic combination of recollected experiences presented in the
mind as occurring now. The ability to experience past implicit
visual perceptions characterizes dreams, as the ability to experi-
ence explicit perception characterizes visual consciousness during
wakefulness.
What differentiate phenomenological explicit from implicit
perception are (a) the bizzarness, (b) threatening, (c) vivid col-
ored faces, (d) absence of bodies and limbs, (e) lack of iden-
tification and recognition. The switch to wakefulness may be
not concomitant with conscious recognition of false imagery,
sometimes a longer duration of wakefulness is requiered.
Interpretation in wakeness state of the visual imagery as being real
means pathology.
Hallucinations are implicit perception, internally generated by
the brain, which instead of appearing in the dream state appear in
wakefulness, e.g., due to structural lesions of the brain.
During the sleep state a concomitant implicit and explicit
perception may occur in lucid dreaming. In the wake state a
concomitent implicit and explicit perception may occur in a
hallucinatoric brain. In a normal physiologic brain the implicit
perception appears as a past experience and is called reminding
or remebering. The consciousness of distinguishing the present
from the past allows the implicit perception to appear as memory.
The fourth element of existence “the time” differentiates memory
from implicit perception.
The gestalt waking brain is obliged to separate the implicit
from the explicit perception, in order to allow consciousness. If
not, the implicit is integrated in the explicit and the extrasensory
perception becomes hallucinatory mixture of real and unreal.
The activity of the brainstem and cortical areas during sleep
allow an implicit perception to become explicit. The switch to
wakefulness may not be concomitant with consciousness of false
experiences.
Domhoff has developed a “cognitive theory of dream” that
suggests a conceptual system which forms the basis for knowl-
edge and beliefs. During wakefulness it serves for thought and
imagination. In sleep it is active within the cortical mature neu-
ral network, when external stimuli are blocked and conscious
self-control is lost:
A “dream” is a formof thinking during sleep that, as already briefly
stated, occurs when there is (1) an intact and fully mature neural
network for dreaming; (2) an adequate level of cortical activation;
(3) an occlusion of external stimuli by the sensory gates located
in the thalamus; and (4) the loss of conscious self-control, i.e., a
shutting down to the cognitive system of “self.” . . . a “dream” is
also what people remember in the morning, so it is in this sense a
“memory” of the dreaming experience (Domhoff, 2010).
Creativity can be based on autonomic brain events that are
initiated in higher brain parts which do not result directly from
experience and information that might otherwise be received
from lower brain parts. A discontinuity of brain structures which
can be accompanied by separate processes and on-going brain
changes, together with the capacity of imagination and dream
recollection as initiated within the brain during different states
of consciousness, may be the basis for an “explanatory gap” and a
“hard problem of consciousness.” Top-down and bottom-up pro-
cesses may be occasionally disconnected leading to a possibility
of independent psychological reality, that is not directly caused
by sensorial inputs, or otherwise emerge from such inputs in a
complex delayed and dynamic ways that can not be inferred from
direct observations of lower brain processes.
John Searle makes the same point. He writes that a dream
of something red may involve a change in the content of con-
sciousness that is not based on experience but is created in the
brain:
Like many people, I dream in color. When I see the color red in
a dream, I do not have a perceptual input that creates a building
block of red. Rather the mechanisms in the brain that create the
whole unified field of dream consciousness create my experience
of red as part of the field (Searle, 2004: 155).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a
low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the
low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are unex-
pected given the principles governing the low-level domain. Weak
emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in recent
scientific discussions. A high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent
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with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon
arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phe-
nomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the
low-level domain . . . I think there is exactly one clear case of a
strongly emergent phenomenon, and that is the phenomenon of
consciousness (Chalmers, 2006).
Chalmers defines a system property of weak emergence which
corresponds to an analytic, bottom-up construction of knowl-
edge. A bottom-up process may start with some sensory inputs
which affect some neurons, that change and form new networks
with different strengths of connections. According to such a sci-
entific view, consciousness, memories and thoughts are the result
of a neuronal integrated activity. Cases that might be described
with the concept of weak emergence of system properties and sim-
ple learning have been studied in simple organisms such as the
Aplysia californica (Kandel, 2006). One day, it is said, it will be
possible to form a dynamic model of neurons, their interconnec-
tions and their relative strengths. If achieved, this might result in
a conscious behavior or at least as a tool to change and enhance
cognition.
Chalmers defines a second concept of strong emergence which
requires a high level of system knowledge through a top-down
approach to exploration. Chalmers claims that knowledge about
consciousness is a case in point, where a bottom-up methods
will not do for a complete and detailed explanation. His sugges-
tion follows the ideas of the 17th century philosopher Gottfried
Leibniz and those of the 20th century founder of general sys-
tem theory, the biologist von Bertalanffy (1968). Both promoted
the application of a whole system top-down approach to living
systems (i.e., animals).
We have suggested in this article that dreams include self gen-
erated brain images and are results of implicit perception. They
are formed by brain networks in the gestalt brain through the
activity of neurons and synapses already consolidated and gen-
erating false memories integrated with true memories. In this
way dream can change the brain by the activation of relatively
large neuron ensembles, eliberated from the consciousness con-
trol. We can farther speculate that thinking, moral judgments,
complex learning (i.e., language acquisition), and many other
mental activities, require a concept of strong emergence of con-
sciousness and top-down brain processes. There are other similar
states of affairs that are quite common in biology, e.g., swarm
behavior.
The neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles and the philoso-
pher Sir Karl Popper had cooperated to find explanations for
consciousness, brain and the self. Popper identified the self with
full consciousness which, according to him, controls human
action.
Full consciousness . . . consists mainly of thought processes . . . The
self, or full consciousness is exercising a plastic control over some
of our movements which, if so controlled, are human action . . .
The novel structures that emerge always interact with the basic
structure of physical states from which they emerged . . . Mental
states interact with physiological states (Popper, 1994: 115, 132).
Eccles introduced his hypothesis of interaction between self-
conscious mind and the brain. He presented a hypothesis that
the unity of consciousness is provided by itself rather than by
neural cells in the brain. He went as far as making the following
statements:
The self-conscious mind exercises a superior interpretative and
controlling role upon the neural events. The unity of conscious
experience is provided by the self-conscious mind and not by the
neural machinery (Popper and Eccles, 1977: 355).
The traditional scientific bottom-up methodology concen-
trates on the analysis of modular substructures and biochemical
processes within the brain. A top-down concept elaborates a
diverged activity from consciousness and cognition to various
structures and functions of the brain. Top-down research has
concentrated more on high level study of consciousness and
cognition, and has gained its own place by taking a system
approach to questions on brain and consciousness. John Searle
has a similar observation:
Most researchers adopt the building block approach . . . It seems
very difficult to try to studymassive amounts of synchronized neu-
ron firings that might produce consciousness in large portions of
the brain such as the thalamocortical system . . . I am betting on
the unified-field approach (Searle, 2004: 155–156).
We have followed the above thinkers by highlighting some
facts and evidences that can shed light on these two antithetic
approaches. We have tried to view consciousness and brain inter-
action through an instance of exceptional recovery from a broad
and dramatic damage to the brain, and by a demonstration
of acquired evidences of neuroplasticity in the nervous system
through life cycles of wakefulness and sleep. It is evident that
consciousness changes the brain while it is also being changed
by the brain. Procedural and declarative memory, their acqui-
sition and consolidation are all changes in the nervous system
that involve both consciousness and the brain bi-directionally and
interactively.
Richard Davidson has been using concepts and phrases
such as contemplative neuroscience, neural-inspired behavioral
or mental interventions, putting the mind back in medicine,
and mental exercise. He and his team have conducted experi-
ments where meditation was used as a conscious mental prac-
tice, while consequential changes in the brain were tested with
fMRI. Based on his experiments Davidson has suggested that
mental training changes the structure and function of the
brain:
Mental training of meditation is fundamentally no different than
other forms of skill acquisition that can induce plastic changes in
the brain (Davidson and Lutz, 2008).
In a later paper he wrote that
Moderate to severe stress appears to increase the growth of several
sectors of the amygdala, whereas the effects in the hippocampus
and prefrontal cortex tend to be opposite. Structural and func-
tional changes in the brain have been observed with cognitive
therapy and certain forms of meditation, we can also take more
responsibility for our minds and brains by engaging in certain
mental exercises that can induce plastic changes in the brain, it is
apparent that both structural and functional connectivity between
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prefrontal regions and sub cortical structures is extremely impor-
tant for emotion regulation and that these connections represent
important targets for plasticity-induced changes (Davidson and
McEwen, 2012).
It is a common experience and has been observed scientifically
that the nervous system changes continuously following internal
and external events as well as thoughts, imaginations and dreams.
Such changes are followed by changes in memory and content
of consciousness. It is clear that the damage caused to the brain
of I.K. by his stroke changed his consciousness rather dramati-
cally. There is no doubt in our minds that his outstanding brain
functions recovery was also the result of his strong will and deter-
mination. It was a whole system top-down effect, rather than a
property of separate groups of neurons in his brain. This case
and other similar cases could lead to a conclusion that medical
treatment should target the bidirectional activity of the nervous
system, and could better perform if both bottom-up and top-
down considerations would be applied in medical interventions,
i.e., to add methods that are intended to activate changes in the
content of consciousness to more traditional treatments of struc-
tural lesions. A combined approach could promote physical and
mental health.
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